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Crop Insurance, Disaster Payments, and Land
Use Change: The Effect of Sodsaver on
Incentives for Grassland Conversion
Roger Claassen, Joseph C. Cooper, and Fernando Carriazo
Subsidized crop insurance may encourage conversion of native grassland to cropland. The
Sodsaver provision of the 2008 farm bill could deny crop insurance on converted land in the
Prairie Pothole states for 5 years. Supplemental Revenue Assistance payments, which are
linked to crop insurance purchases, could also be withheld. Using representative farms, we
estimate that Sodsaver would reduce expected crop revenue by up to 8% and expected net
return by up to 20%, while increasing the standard deviation of revenue by as much as 6% of
market revenue. Analysis based on elasticities from the literature suggests that Sodsaver
would reduce grassland conversion by 9% or less.
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The potential environmental impacts of Federal
farm programs—commodity programs, crop
insurance, and disaster payments—continue to
receive attention from a wide variety of groups,
including federal and local government, non-
governmental organizations, and the popular
press. Recent concern has focused on the role
of federally subsidized crop insurance in the
conversion of grassland to cropland. Environ-
mentalists, wildlife groups, and some livestock
interests are particularly concerned about the
loss of native grasslands in the Prairie Pothole
Region (PPR) of the Northern Plains (Morgan,
2008).
Grasslands are important breeding habitats
for ducks and other migratory birds. About
50% of North American ducks are produced in
the grasslands of the Northern Plains, even
though this habitat accounts for only 10% of
duck breeding territory (U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administrationand others). Ducks are particu-
larly drawn to small wetlands surrounded by
grasslands—a key feature of the PPR. Many other
migratory birds also depend on these grasslands,
including a number of species that are shown by
the Breeding Birds Survey to be in decline: the
grasshopper sparrow, bobolink, Baird’s sparrow,
northern harrier, horned lark, loggerhead shrike,
and lark sparrow (Johnson, 2000).
Fragmentation of grasslands (through conver-
sion to cropland, for example), overgrazing, and
the spread of invasive species are damaging the
quality of habitats for ducks and other grassland-
dependent species (Conner et al., 2010). When
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 2011 Southern Agricultural Economics Associationcompared with cultivated cropland, grasslands
store substantial amounts of carbon (Eve et al.,
2002) and produce runoff that is relatively free of
the sediment, nutrients, and pesticides that can
damage wetlands and water quality in general
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007).
In a study of grassland to cropland conver-
sion for 1985–2003, Stephens et al. (2006)
show that grassland losses averaged 0.6% per
year in the ‘‘Hyde-Hand’’ area of South Dakota,
a region that includes all of Hyde, Hand, and
Faulk Counties in East-Central South Dakota
and parts of surrounding counties including
Sully and Edmunds. At that rate, grassland loss
approaching 10% would have been observed
over the 18-year study period. These findings
are generally supported by Farm Service Agency
data on ‘‘new breakings’’ for 2005 and 2006,
which also indicates a relatively high rate of
grassland to cropland conversion in this portion
of South Dakota.
Once lost, native grassland habitats are dif-
ficult to restore. The native grasses can be
readily replanted but only at significant expense.
A U.S. Government Accountability Office
(USGAO) report (2007) cites Fish and Wildlife
Service estimates of $200 per acre for native
grass restoration in South Dakota where grass-
land prices range from $750–$1,050 per acre.
Other components of native grassland including
forbs, vertebrate animals, invertebrates, and soil
microorganisms are important to the quality of
the grassland habitat but cannot be readily re-
stored (Johnson, 2000).
Crop insurance indemnities and disaster pay-
ments have been cited as contributing to grass-
land conversion. At current subsidy rates, farmers
who purchase 70% coverage (the most popular
level in the Northern Plains) pay only 41% of
insurance premiums (the subsidy rate is 59% for
70% coverage). The USGAO (2007) study notes
that the 16 South Dakota counties with the largest
number of converted acres (according to Farm
Service Agency new breakings data) had an av-
erage annual crop insurance indemnity of $13 per
acre while the average annual indemnity was less
than $7 in all other counties. Although disaster
assistance has been ad hoc in recent years, di-
saster payments of some type were approved by
Congress in every year between 1985 and 2007,
totaling $30 billion over that period (Goodwin
and Rejesus, 2008). Stephens et al. (2006) note
that disaster payments in the ‘‘high-conversion’’
countiesofHyde, Hand, andFaulk were roughly
$60 per cropland acre between 1996 and 2004,
while these payments were only $10 per acre in
Lake, Moody, and Minnehaha counties, where
cropproductionhaslongbeenthedominantland
use.
In response to concern about the loss of
grassland habitat andthe roleoffarmprograms,
the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of
2008 (hereafter the 2008 Farm Act) included
a limited version of a ‘‘Sodsaver’’ provision. If
implemented, Sodsaver would deny crop in-
surance coverage for the first 5 years of crop
production on land converted from nativegrass.
Because benefits from the new standing di-
saster program—the Supplemental Revenue
Assistance (SURE) program (also part of the
2008 Farm Act)—are contingent on crop in-
surance purchase (where available), these pay-
ments may also bedenied.However, Sodsaver is
limited to PPR states (Iowa, Minnesota, South
Dakota, North Dakota, and Montana) and will
be implemented only at the governor’s request.
As of February 2011, there have been no re-
quests for Sodsaver implementation.
The manager’s statement accompanying the
House-Senate conference committee report on
the 2008 Farm Act also requested additional
study of the role of crop insurance in grassland
conversion, indicating that additional research
could affect the eventual implementation of a
Sodsaver-type program. Previous studies on the
landuse effect of cropinsurance (e.g., Goodwin,
Vandeveer, and Deal, 2004; Lubowski et al.,
2006) have concluded that the overall effect of
crop insurance is small. Depending on the study,
subsidized crop insurance may have increased
land in crop production by 1–3 million acres
nationally. Nonetheless, this issue is worth
revisiting. Previous studies use data from the
1990s or earlier, predating the increase in crop
insurance premium subsidies that began in 1999
and was codified in the Agricultural Risk Pro-
tection Act of 2000. Furthermore, the SURE
program offers disaster benefits to producers
who purchase crop insurance but does not re-
quire the payment of an additional premium.
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grassland conversion will depend on (1) how
crop insurance and SURE affect the mean and
variability of crop revenue on converted grass-
land over the period of the Sodsaver sanction and
(2) how these changes in revenue affect producer
plans for grassland to cropland conversion. To
gauge the effect of Sodsaver on crop revenue and
returns, we devise seven representative farms
based on North and South Dakota countieswhere
grassland to cropland conversion was particu-
larly high in 2005–2006 (Table 1). To provide
context, we also develop farms representing two
South Dakota counties(Turner and Union)where
most land is cropped and conditions are similar
to western Corn Belt conditions. Producers
in these ‘‘comparison’’ counties, located in the
southeast corner of South Dakota, generally
enjoy higher yields and lower yield variability
than in the high conversion counties that are lo-
cated to the west and north. These producers face
lower crop insurance premiums and, therefore,
receive smaller premium subsidies (as a percent-
age of revenue) than producers in the high con-
version counties.
We assume that each representative farmer
maximizes utility and is risk averse. The effect
of Sodsaver sanctions is estimated as the: (1)
change in expected revenue; (2) increase in
standard deviation of revenue; (3) risk premiums
producers would be willing to pay to retain risk
reduction that would be lost during the 5-year
Sodsaver moratorium; and (4) likely effect of
these changes on grassland conversion, given
land use conversion elasticities drawn from the
literature. In the next section, we develop models
of crop insurance and SURE, accounting for
U.S. Department of Agriculture Risk Manage-
ment Agency (RMA) rules regarding insurance
coverage on land that has no history of crop
production. Marketing loan benefits could also
affect grassland conversion decisions but these
are not affected by Sodsaver. Following de-
velopment of policy models we develop a theo-
retical framework for estimating producer risk
premiums based on the loss of risk reduction due
to Sodsaver. In the following section, we develop
simulation methods. At the heart of each rep-
resentative farm is a joint distribution of prices
and yields for major crops (corn, soybeans, and
wheat) and livestock grazing where revenue per
animal unit (AU) is the ‘‘price’’ and the stocking
rate (AUper acre)isthe ‘‘yield.’’ After developing
the joint distributions, we show how they are
combined with program models to estimate mean
and variance effects and, finally, to estimate risk
premiums. Next, we report and discuss simu-
lation results including the potential effect of















Stutsman NA 1,971 1,971 9.57 0.975
South Dakota
Beadle 2,055 2,101 4,156 4.05 0.841
Edmunds 3,845 4,361 8,207 8.00 2.082
Faulk 2,831 2,170 5,001 4.88 1.138
Hand 5,040 2,748 7,788 7.59 1.063
Hyde 2,835 1,501 4,336 4.23 0.818
Sully 1,867 3,943 5,810 5.66 2.865
North Dakota total (2006) 1,971 9.57
South Dakota total (2005 and 2006) 35,298 34.41
Source: Farm Service Agency
a When land is cropped for the first time, farmers who receive farm program payments must request an environmental review to
determine whether sodbuster or swampbuster sanctions apply. New breakings are the number of acres reviewed.
b New breakings totaled 20,592 acres in North Dakota in 2006 and 102,571 acres in South Dakota for 2005 and 2006,
combined.
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version. In the final section we offer con-
cluding remarks on the potential effectiveness




Currently, RMA new land rules govern crop
insurance coverage on converted grassland in
the first few years of crop production. In gen-
eral, insurance purchase requires at least 1 year
of actual crop history, so land cannot be insured
in the first year of crop production.
1 On land
with 1–3 years of crop history, RMA uses
special rules to calculate actual production
history (APH) yields. Typically, the APH yield
is the average of the producer’s previous 10
crop yields, but could be calculated from as few
as 4 actual yields. On existing cropland that
has fewer than 4 years of crop insurance yield
history, RMA uses transitional yields (which are
based on historic county yields) to fill out the
yield history. On land that has not been cropped
(including converted grassland) RMA new land
rules require farmers to accept a 10 to 20%
reduction in the transitional yields, reducing
the APH yield. Because RMA premium rating
methods assume that a lower APH yield in-
dicates a higher likelihood of loss, the reduction
in APH yield increases the premium rate (U.S.
Department of Agriculture Risk Management
Agency, 2007) and reduces the expected in-
demnity, reducing net return to crop insurance
purchase, at least in the short run.
The specific reduction in transitional yields
depends on when crop insurance is first pur-
chased. If land is cropped for the first time in
year t, and the producer purchases insurance
in year t 1 1, transitional yields used to fill out
the yield history are reduced by 20%. For
producers who defer insurance purchase until
year t 1 2, transitional yields are reduced by
10%. We assume first purchase of crop in-
surance is in year t 1 1.
We also estimate the effect of Sodsaver if
RMA new land rules were relaxed. In the ‘‘No
Restriction’’ scenario, farmers can purchase crop
insurance in the first year of production and
transitional yields are used as to fill out yield
histories, without reduction, to calculate the APH
yield.
In the Northern Plains in 2007, Revenue
Assurance (RA) accounted for 74% of insured
corn acreage (most insured for 70 and 75%
coverage), 82% of insured soybean acreage
(mostly 70 and 75% coverage), and 44% of
insured wheat acreage (almost all of it at 65,
70, or 75% coverage). For the purpose of our
analysis, we assume that all three crops are
insured under RA at 70% coverage. Under the
base price option, the per-acre indemnity is:
(1) Iit5maxððupb
it  yit   pityitÞ,0 Þ
where Iit is the indemnity for crop i at time t, u is
the coverage level, pb
it i st h eR Ab a s e( e x p e c t e d )
price,   yit is the producer’s APH yield, pit is the
realized price, and yit is the actual yield.
Bylaw, U.S. DepartmentofAgriculturemust
attempt to devise actuarially fair premiums.
2
Actuarially fair premiums are equal to the ex-
pected indemnity, but farmer-paid premiums are
subsidized by the federal government:
(2) rit5 1   g ðÞ EðIitÞ
where rit is the farmer-paid premium and g is
the premium subsidy (59% for 70% coverage).
For converted grassland, where new land
rules apply and assuming that crop insurance
is purchased in the second year of crop pro-
duction, the APH yield for crop i would evolve
as:
1Crops could be insured during the first year of
production through written agreement. Written agree-
ments are developed (or denied) on a case-by-case
basis and cannot be effectively modeled.
2Some researchers have argued that premiums are
not actuarially fair (Just, Calvin, and Quiggen, 1999;
Makki and Somwaru, 2001). RMA data shows that
crop insurance losses are persistent in the Northern
Plains (Glauber, 2003), suggesting that premiums are
low and that our estimates of the crop insurance
premiums may be, on average, higher than actual
premiums.




i,t11 5ðð1   0:20Þð~ yi,t 1 1~ yi,t 2 1~ yi,t 3Þ
1yitÞ=4
  yNL
i,t12 5ðð1   0:20Þð~ yi,t 1 1~ yi,t 2Þ1yit
1yi,t11Þ=4
  yNL
i,t13 5ðð1   0:20Þ~ yi,t 1 1yit 1yi,t11
1yi,t12Þ=4
  yNL
i,t1t 5t 1 X t1t 1
s5t
yis t54,5.
where   yNL
it is the APH yield for crop i at time t
and ~ yi,t 1 is the transitional yield for time t 2 1.
In the No Restriction scenario, where the new
landrules are relaxed,theAPHwouldevolve as:
(4)
  yNR
it 5ð~ yi,t 1 1~ yi,t 2 1~ yi,t 3 1~ yi,t 4Þ=4
  yNR
i,t11 5ð~ yi,t 1 1~ yi,t 2 1~ yi,t 3 1yitÞ=4
  yNR
i,t12 5ð~ yi,t 1 1~ yi,t 2 1yit 1yi,t11Þ=4
  yNR
i,t13 5ð~ yi,t 1 1yit 1yi,t11 1yi,t12Þ=4
  yNR




Payments can be made only to producers who are
located in counties where a disaster has been
declared (for our analysis, we assume that the
SecretaryofAgriculturedetermines that there has
been a weather-related production loss of 35% or
more in at least one crop), counties contiguous to
disaster counties, or to any producer who expe-
riences production 50% or more below normal
levels.
3 Once a disaster is declared, the SURE
payment is made when whole-farm revenue
drops below a revenue guarantee:
(5) Dt 5 maxð0:60ðGt   RtÞ,0 Þ
where Gt is the SURE guarantee and Rt is total
farm revenue. The SURE guarantee depends on
the levelof crop insurance coverage selected by
the producer, expected prices, and the pro-
ducer’s APH yield, but is limited to no more
















where ait is planted acreage of crop i at time t
(or acreage where planting was prevented) and
y
ccp
i is the producer’s counter-cyclical payment
program yield. Total farm revenue (for crops)
includes market revenue, crop insurance in-




ait pityit 1Iit 1Lit ðÞ 10:15DPt 1CCPt
where Lit is the per-acre marketing loan benefit,
DPt is the producer’s total (farm-level) direct
payment, and CCPt is the total counter-cyclical
payment.
4 When the market price of a covered
commodity (e.g., corn, wheat, soybeans) drops
below a fixed ‘‘loan rate,’’ the marketing loan
benefit is the difference between the loan rate
and the market price:
(8) Lit5maxðð  pi   pitÞyit,0 Þ
where   pi is the loan rate. The change in the
SURE payment triggered by bringing new land
into crop production is:
(9) DDt5maxð0:60ðDGt   DRtÞ,0 Þ.
If cropping patterns on new land reflect those
of the overall farm, the per-acre change in the
guarantee will be:
3Smith and Watts (2010) note that offering pay-
ments to individuals who experience low revenue may
result in moral hazard for farmers who anticipate
losses large enough to trigger crop insurance indem-
nities but not large enough to trigger SURE payments.
Once losses are large enough to trigger crop insurance
indemnities, additional losses are fully offset by in-
demnities (assuming the market price is at or below the
insurance price, which varies depending on the in-
surance product purchased). Producers who destroy
enough of their crop (through lax practices or outright
fraud) to qualify for SURE payments would see an
increase in overall revenue due to the addition of the
SURE payment. We do not attempt to model this
behavior but recognize that these incentives exist.
4Farm revenue, as specified in the text, assumes the
farmer will stay with traditional commodity programs.
Farmers who choose the Average Crop Revenue Elec-
tion program (ACRE) will lose countercyclical pay-
ments while direct payments will be reduced by 20%
and the loan rate by 30%.
















ait is total crop acreage at time t.
Under the new land rules, the per-acre change




ðait AtÞ pityit 1INL
it 1Lit
    
where INL
it is the crop insurance indemnity under
the new land rules (the change in revenue for the
No Restriction scenario is obtained by replacing
INL
it with INR
it ). We do not include direct and
countercyclical payments because they do not
apply to new land. For the sake of brevity, we
assume that planting decisions on existing crop-
land will not be affected by land use conversion.
Risk Premiums: When facing the new land
rules, the producer’s risk premium—his will-
ingness to pay for the risk reduction due to crop
insurance and SURE—is defined as:
(12)
Eu ðwt 1pNL









where u is utility, wt is wealth at the beginning of
period t, yNL
t is the risk premium, pNL
t is the
producer’s net return during period t,a n duNL
t is
a term that eliminates the risk reducing effect of
crop insurance and SUREon convertedgrassland
while holding expected profit and expected end-
of-period wealth constant. The left hand side of
Equation (12) is expected utility when crop in-
surance and SURE are available, less the risk
premium. The right-hand side of Equation (12) is
expected utility when variance reduction due to
crop insurance and SURE is removed. Suppose,
for example, that uNL
t i ss e tu pt or e m o v et h e
variance reduction due to crop insurance, and, for
simplicity, assume that the producer grows only
one crop. The producer’s profit at time t would
be: pNL
t 5ptyt   ct 1INL
t   rt,w h e r ect is crop
production cost. To remove the risk reducing
effect of crop insurance without also reducing
expected profit, we set uNL





t 5ptyt   ct 1EðINL
t Þ rt.
Effectively, uNL
t removes annual indemnity pay-
ments and replaces them with a payment that
equals the expected value of the indemnity.
Without the countercyclical effect of crop in-
surance indemnities, the variance of crop revenue
would rise while the expected value payment
ðEðINL
t ÞÞ maintains expected net return equal to
the case where crop insurance indemnities are
paid. In other words, pNL
t 1uNL
t is a mean pre-
serving spread of pNL
t . So, a risk averse pro-




t   yNL
t .
Simulation Methods and Data
We develop a series of representative farms
based primarily on county data. Underlying
each representative farm is a joint distribution
of prices and yields for the three predominant
crops (corn, soybeans, and wheat) and grazing
land. Our work builds on, but is distinct from
previous efforts to develop joint price-yield dis-
tributions such as Vedenov and Powers (2008),
Featherstone and Kastens (2000), and Gray et al.
(2004). In this section, we (1) develop the price
and yield distributions, (2) show how the mean
and variance effects of program benefits are
calculated using these distributions, and (3)
specify the utility function, farm-level profit, and
risk parameters needed (along with the joint
distributions) to estimate risk premiums.
Price and Yield Distributions: The joint dis-
tribution of yields and prices for corn, soybeans,
and wheat is modeled by generating correlated
within-season price and yield deviates (Cooper,
2009, 2010). First, national average yields (ob-
tained from the National Agricultural Statistics
Service (NASS)) are re-expressed as within-
season yield deviations for crop i in year s as
DYis 5 Yis   EY is ðÞ ðÞ =EY is ðÞ ,w h e r ee x p e c t e d
yields, E(Yis) are estimated by regressing na-
tional average yields on a linear trend using
data for 1975–2008. We use capital letters to
denote past yields and prices, distinguishing
them from the prospective yields and prices,
and s to denote past years. County yields,
obtained from NASS, are also transformed to
deviation form (denoted as DYk
is)w h e r ek in-
dexes the county.
Realized harvest prices are also transformed
into deviation form: DPis 5 Pis   EP is ðÞ ðÞ =
EP is ðÞ where E(Pis) is the planting time ex-
pected price. We follow RMA definitions for
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, May 2011 200expected (RA base) and realized prices. The
expected price of corn is the average of daily
closing prices in February for the December
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) corn contract.
The realized price is the average of daily closing
prices during October for the CBOT December
corn contract. Expected and realized soybean
prices are based on the February and October
prices, respectively, for the December CBOT
soybean contract. For hard red spring wheat,
expected and realized prices are based on March
and August prices, respectively, for the Minne-
apolis Grain Exchange September contract.
The relationship between price and yield
vectors is estimated by regressing DPi on DYi
and other explanatory variables (zi):
(13) DPi 5g DYi, zi
  
1 ei
where ei is the error term. We expect that
dDPi
 
dDYi < 0, i.e., the greater the realization
of national average yield over the expected
level, the more likely harvest time price will
be lower than the expected price. See Cooper
(2009, 2010) for details.
We jointly estimate the distributions of price
and yield deviations by repeated estimation of
Equation (13) using a pairs bootstrap approach
in a joint resampling methodology that involves
drawing independent and identically distributed
observations with replacement from the original
data set (e.g., Yatchew, 1998). For each draw
of a yield deviation, we estimate a price-yield
coefficient vector using Equation (13). The
procedure creates M (51,000) coefficient vec-
tors representing uncertainty in the yield-price
relationship.
Next, deviation vectors for national and
county yields, D^ Yi and D^ Y
k
i, respectively, i 5
1,..,3, (i.e., corn, soybeans, and wheat) are gen-
erated using a block-bootstrap approach (e.g.,
Lahiri, 1999) in which the pairwise relationship
between yield values is maintained across each
crop and yield aggregation. We draw N (5
1,000) times with replacement from DYi and
DYk
i, i 5 1,..,3, k 5 1,...,9, always drawing
from the same row (same s) from all vectors.
The simulated yield data maintains the under-
lying historical Pearson and rank correlation, as
well as any other relationship between the var-
iables, between county and national yield data,
both within crops and across crops. For each
element of the simulated national yield de-
viation vector (e.g., D^ Yni where n indexes the
elements of D^ Yi) we generate M simulated price
deviations for each crop based on the M price-
yield coefficient vectors, resulting in an M   N
(1000   1000) price deviation matrix, D^ Pi, with
typical element D^ Pmni.
We do not extrapolate yields into the future
using estimated trends. If yields are trending
upward, APH yields will lag behind actual yields,
decreasing the probability of a crop insurance
indemnity. Modeling the trend, however, would
require modeling the effect of higher yields on
crop prices without other variables used in esti-
mating price deviations. Forecasting those vari-
ables would add considerably to the uncertainty
of our results.
We make two adjustments to the crop yield
distributions. First, grassland is less productive,
on average, than cropland. In the seven ‘‘high
conversion’’ counties we consider, average ran-
geland productivity is 18% lower than average
cropland productivity.
5 Because relatively high
productivity rangeland is most likely to be con-
verted to crop production, we assume that crop
yields on converted grassland will be about 10%
lower than on average cropland.
Second, farm-level crop yields are typi-
cally more variable than county average yields.
To represent farm-level yields, county-level yield
standard deviations are inflated using a method
similar to that of Coble, Dismukes, and Thomas
(2007). We select the inflation factor, aki, such
that the APH indemnity calculated from our




















ni1hniððaki  sð^ Y
k
iÞÞ







i, hin is a N(0,1) random variable, sð^ Y
k
iÞ is the
5Average productivity is based on land use in-
formation from the 2007 National Resources Inventory
(U.S. Department of Agriculture Natural Resources
Conservation Service, 2009) and the National Com-
modity Crop Productivity Indicator or NCCPI (Dobos,
Sinclair, and Hipple, 2008).
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k
i, wk
i is the RMA pre-
mium rate (excluding the fixed rate load), pAPH
i
is the APH price, and the coverage rate, u,i s
0.65. The expected value and standard de-
viation of resulting yields are reported in Table
2. Full covariance matrices are available from
the authors upon request. In the balance of the
paper, we drop the county superscript (k)t o
reduce clutter.
Yield and price deviation vectors are also
created for grazing land. We assume that grass-
lands are used for cow-calf operations. Cow-calf
revenue per animal unit is based on Economic
Research Service (ERS) farm cost and returns
estimates for the Northern Plains for 1975–2008.
Expected revenue is the trend revenue obtained
by regressing revenue on lagged revenue, futures
prices (average of July closing for fed cattle for
the following year August contract, i.e., July
2002 closing prices for August 2003 contract),
and a time trend. Revenue variability is based
onthe error term. Forageyieldvariabilityis based
on Natural Resource Conservation Service Soil
Survey estimates for normal years, favorable
years, and unfavorableyears. Following USGAO,
we assume that favorable conditions are realized
with 20% higher than average rainfall and un-
favorable conditions occur when rainfall is 20%
lower than average. Forage yields are converted
to stocking rates (animal units per acre) using
rules derived from Natural Resource Conserva-
tion Service technical documents (see Metz,
2007). Deviationvectors for cow-calf revenue (the
‘‘price’’ in dollars per AU) and stocking rate (the
‘‘yield’’ in AU per acre) are generated as part of
the block-bootstrap procedure already described.
We draw N (51,000) times with replacement
from the cow-calf revenue and forage yield
vectors always drawing from the same row
(same year) as crop yield vectors to maintain
historical correlations between the grazing
‘‘price’’ and ‘‘yield’’ as well aswith crop prices
and yields.
Expected Value and Variance of Crop Reve-
nue:As no better estimate of prices and yields
(excluding the yield trend) exists for periods
t 5 1,..., T than the estimates for period 0,
we assume that the density of price and
y i e l di st h es a m ef o re a c hp e r i o d ,t h ea l l o -

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, May 2011 202total crop acres are fixed except for the
conversion of grassland from within the
farm. We drop time subscripts for acreages,
expected (RA base) prices, realized prices,
and actual yields but retain the time sub-
script for the APH yields because they
evolve through time during the first few
years of crop production.
Using the joint distribution, the expected
value of crop insurance indemnities that would
be denied by Sodsaver, assuming the new land














it ðpmni,yni ju,  yNL
it Þ.
where T is the time horizon (55) and dt is
a discount factor based on a 7% discount rate.
Similar expressions are used to calculate the
expected value of market revenue, SURE pay-
ments, marketing loan benefits, and total rev-
enue under RMA new land rules and the No
Restriction scenario. The variance of crop
revenue on converted acreage, given the new











dt DRtðpmni,yni ju,  yNL
it Þ
 
 EðDRtðpmni,yni ju,  yNL
it ÞÞ
 2.
Other variance expressions are obtained by
changing the APH calculation or excluding
crop insurance and SURE from the revenue
calculation. Cropland and grazing acreages are
county averages from the 2007 Census of Ag-
riculture (Table 3). The proportion of cropland
in corn, soybeans, and wheat is based on 3-year
averages (2005–2007) of NASS county esti-
mates (Table 3).
Risk Premiums: To simulate risk premiums
we specify utility as a power function:
uðwt 1ptÞ5ðwt 1ptÞ
1 h.
ð1   hÞ, where h
is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and
wt 1 pt is end of period wealth. This function
has been used previously in similar work (see
Gray et al., 2004; Vedenov and Powers,
2008). End of period wealth is based on ini-
tial wealth and farm profits. Under the new
land rules, farm profit is represented by:
where A is crop acreage before conversion; Pi is
market price for crop i; yi is the yield; Li is the
marketing loan benefit; Iit is the crop insurance
indemnity, Ci is per-acre cost; and rit is the per-
acre insurance premium;Dtis the SURE payment;
CCP is the countercyclical payment; DP is the
direct payment; Aconv is acreage converted from
grass to crops; INL
it is the indemnity on converted
land;DDNL
t i sth echan gei nSU REpaym e ntd uet o
conversion; Ag is grazing acreage before conver-
sion; Rg is annual per-acre grazing land revenue,
and Cg is annual per-acre grazing land (beef cow-
calf) cost. Finally, to complete the specification of
the RHS of Equation (12), uNL
t eliminates the
counter cyclical effect of crop insurance and














Other data needed to specify farm profits are
given in Table 3. While the price-yield distribu-
tions are used to specify revenue, crop-specific
non-land production costs are based on ERS
estimates for the Northern Great Plains for 2007
(we assume that net return is the residual return
to land). Production costs are aggregated using
crop proportions as weights. Non-land cost per
animal unit in the Northern Great Plains is
obtained from the ERS and converted to cost per
acre using the estimated stocking rate.
Initial wealth is based on the county average













it   Ci   ritÞ
 !
1DDNL
t 1ðAg   AconvÞðRg   CgÞ
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43 to 61%, based on the 2007 Agriculture Cen-
sus) and debt-to-asset ratio (0.17, based on the
2007 ERS farm balance sheet for the Northern
Plains). Over the 5-year period of the Sodsaver
sanction, a producer’s actual wealth could ac-
cumulate (decline) as farms experience profits
(losses) possibly reducing (increasing) the risk
premium in years 2–5. Given the uncertainty
surrounding initial wealth in years 2–5, we elect
to calculate a risk premium for each year using
initial wealth based on the 2007 Agriculture
Census data (i.e., assuming wt 5 w0, t 5 1,...4)
and report the 5-year net present value (NPV) of
annual risk premiums.
Finally, we assume that the coefficient of rel-
ative risk aversion is constant and equal to 2 (see
Harwood et al., 1999) but test the sensitivity of the
model using values of 1.5 and 2.5. A range of
values have been estimated for U.S. agriculture.
Many studies report values in the range of 1–3, as
reported in Table 2 ofSaha,Shumway,and Talpaz
(1994), although some studies report higher
values, at least on the upper end of a range (e.g.,
Chavas and Holt (1990) report a range 1.42–6.76
for constant relative risk aversion). More recently,
Lence (2000) reports an estimated constant rela-
tive risk aversion of 1.136. Just and Peterson
(2003) also suggest that many risk aversion co-
efficient values reported in the literature are im-
plausibly high. So, we consider only a relatively
narrow range of values. We also consider changes
in acreage and debt-to-asset ratio.
Simulation Results
Sodsaver would deny crop insurance and, by
extension, SURE payments during the first 5
years ofcropproduction onconverted grassland.
Under RMA new land rules, the 5-year net
present value of crop insurance and SURE
payments (what would be withheld under
Sodsaver) range from $26 per acre (Stutsman
County)to$58peracre(HydeandSully)inhigh
conversion counties and are $29–$36 in the
comparison counties (Table 4, Column 3). As
a percentage of total expected crop revenue on
converted grassland, expected payments range
from just over 2% to just over 5% in high






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, May 2011 204both of the comparison counties (Table 4,
Column 4).
If RMA new land rules were eliminated or
by-passed, crop insurance indemnities and SURE
payments could be considerably larger. For the
No Restriction scenario in high conversion
counties, the 5-year NPVof crop insurance and
SURE payments ranges from $39 per acre in
Stutsman County (Table 4, Column 8), a 50%
increase from new land rules (compare Col-
umns 3 and 8), to nearly $90 per acre in Sully
county, a 47% increase from new land rules.In
the comparison counties, the 5-year NPVs also
increase by roughly 50%. As a percentage of
total revenue, the difference in expected net
indemnities and SURE payments between the
new land rules and the No Restriction scenario
ranges from about 1% of total revenue (Stutsman;
subtract column4 (2.11%) from column 9 (3.12%)
in table 4) to more than 2.5% of revenue (Sully)
in the high conversion counties and are about
1.5% in the comparison counties.
Stutsman County is somewhat of an outlier
among high conversion counties—expected
payments in all other high conversion counties
are considerably higher both in absolute dollars
and relative to total revenue. A key difference
between Stutsman and other high conversion
counties is that crop insurance transitional
yields are low relative to expected yields (Table
2). For most counties and crops, our expected
yields (which are 10% less than county average
expected yields) are very close to the transitional
yields. For corn and soybeans in Stutsman
County, however, transitional yields are 13 and
21% less than expected yields, respectively. Lower
transitional yields lead to lower APH yields
which, in turn, mean higher premium rates and
lower guarantees for both crop insurance and
SURE, leading to less frequent and smaller net
crop insurance indemnities and SURE payments.
Simulation results reported in Table 4 con-
sider only the 5 years of the Sodsaver morato-
rium. Over a longer time horizon the effect of
Sodsaver, expressed as a percentage of total
crop revenue, would decline as farmers become
fully eligible for crop insurance and SURE on
converted grassland at the end of the 5-year
Sodsaver moratorium. In Hyde County, for ex-
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years (under new land rules), 2.8% over 10
years, and 2.2% over 15 years.
Results are also based on 2008 when crop
prices were at historically high levels. Lower
expected prices at planting time, however,
would have little effect on expected crop in-
surance indemnities and SURE payments be-
cause these programs protect farmers against
loss of revenue due to unexpectedly low yields
or large intra-season price declines. In Hyde
County, for example, expected net revenue from
crop insurance and SURE payments would re-
main at or near their base levels (roughly $60
per acre under new land rules), even as the
expected prices of corn, soybeans, and wheat
all drop to 50% of base levels (assuming price
volatility does not change). Expected marketing
loan benefits, however, are designed to protect
farmers against low prices in an absolute sense.
When producers expect prices that are 70% of
2008 levels, expected marketing loan benefits
begin to rise and continue rising as expected
prices decline, supporting expected revenue
against further decline. Marketing loan bene-
fits are not subject to Sodsaver sanctions.
Lower expected yields would have a larger
impact on net indemnities and SURE payments
because they also imply higher yield variability.
B a s e do nr e s e a r c hb yS k e e sa n dR e e d( 1 9 8 6 ) ,
RMA rating assumes an inverse relationship
between expected yields and yield variability.
When yields are 10% lower than reported in
Table 2, estimated net indemnities and SURE
payments in Hyde County for the new land rules
would be about $65 per acre, compared with $58
in our base results, a decline of $7 per acre. The
5-year NPV of market revenue also drops from
$1085 to $978, a decline of $107 per acre. So, the
increase in expected net indemnities and SURE
payments would offset less than 7% of the ex-
pected revenue reduction due to lower yields. If
some production costs are also lower, reduction
in net return may be less than $107 per acre.
Standard deviations of crop revenue and risk
premiums are reported in Table 5. With Sodsaver
in force, the range of average annual standard
deviations in high conversion counties is 27 to
48% of expected market revenue and 25 to 26%
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Sodsaver), the average annual standard deviation
in high conversion counties varies from 24%
(Stutsman) to 41% (Sully) of expected market
revenue, reductions ranging from 3 to 7% of
market revenue (Table 5, Column 3). In compar-
ison counties, average annual standard deviations
for market revenue are roughly 25% of expected
market revenue with Sodsaver and would be
about 23% under the new land rules. (Similar
results for the No Restriction scenario are in
Table 5, Column 7).
Farmers may be able to smooth out year-to-
year fluctuations in revenue through borrowing
or the timing of major purchases such as ma-
chinery or consumer durable goods (Just, 2003).
Variability over a period of years, however, is
more difficult to avoid and may be a better in-
dicator of the additional risk faced by producers
subject to Sodsaver. If we consider the 5-year
moratorium as a whole, the revenue standard
deviations fall by roughly one third for both the
new land rule (Table 5, Column 4) and the No
Restriction scenario (Table 5, Column 8). In Sully
County, for example, average annual standard
deviation under the new land rules is 41% of
expected market revenue while the standard
deviation of the 5-year NPVis 28% of expected
market revenue.
The 5-year net present value of annual risk
premiums, based on revenue under the new land
rules, vary from about 0.77% of expected mar-
ket revenue (Edmunds) to just under 2% (Hyde
and Sully) in high conversion counties (Table 5,
Column 6). In the comparison counties, risk
premium estimates are 0.93% (Turner) and
1.08% (Union). In the No Restriction scenario,
estimated risk premiums range from 1.1%
(Edmunds) to 2.7% (Sully) of market revenue
(Table 5, Column 10). Estimated risk premiums
are higher for the No Restriction scenario be-
cause the loss of risk reduction is greater than
under the new land rules—that is, in the absence
of the new land rules, producers facing Sodsaver
would have more to lose. Using some alternate
values of the risk aversion coefficient, the
amount of land converted, and debt-to-asset ra-
tio,risk premiums can be as highas 2.5% forthe
new land rules and 3.5% in the No Restriction
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estimated risk parameters are based on annual
variance.
Finally, using the sum of estimated change in
expected revenue and the risk premium along
with land use change elasticities from the litera-
ture, we estimate the potential effect of Sodsaver
on land conversion. Lubowski, Plantinga, and
Stavins (2008) report a comprehensive set of land
conversion elasticities. For rangeland conver-
sion with respect to cropland returns they report
values of 0.35 or less, although none are signif-
icantly different from zero. For pasture conver-
sion, estimated elasticities are as high as 0.38 and
areall significantly different from zero. Barr et al.
(2010) recently estimated that cropland acreage
would increase by 0.029% for a 1% increase
in net return to crop production. Although not
directly comparable to the values reported by
Lubowski, Plantinga, and Stavins (2008), they do
support the finding that major land use is not
highly responsive to short run economic condi-
tions. Ahmed, Hertel, and Lubowski (2008) show
that, even in the long run, it is reasonable to as-
sume that land use is relatively inelastic with re-
spect to crop returns. Because previously reported
values are likely to depend on geographic scope
and overall economic conditions for the periods
studied, actual response in high conversion
counties may differ. We consider conversion
elasticities between 0.1 and 0.5.
The effect of Sodsaver on net return to crop
production (the change in expected revenue plus
the risk premium) would be largest in Hand,
Hyde, and Sully counties. Under the new land
rules, net crop insurance indemnities and SURE
payments would account for 11.6, 12.5, and
14.0% of net return, respectively (Table 4,
Column 5). Adding in associated risk pre-
miums and assuming that our best estimate of
grassland-to-cropland conversion with respect
to cropland net return is 0.3, these changes in
net revenue reduce conversion by 3.8%, 4.9%,
and 5.4% in Hand, Hyde, and Sully Counties,
respectively (Figure 1). The change in expected
return (without the risk premium) accounts for
81%,73%,and74%oftheeffectinHand,Hyde,
and Sully counties, respectively, indicating the
slowdown in conversion would be 19 to 27%
less if producers are, in fact, risk neutral. In
the comparison counties (Turner and Union),
Sodsaver would reduce net return to crops on
converted grassland by about 4.4% which
translates to reduction in grassland conversion
of less than 2% if the elasticity of land con-
version is 0.3. The change in expected return
(without the risk premium) accounts for about
77% of the land use effect in these counties,
implying that risk neutral producers would slow
conversion by 23% less than risk averse pro-
ducers with constant relative risk aversion of 2.
If conversion elasticities are actually very low,
the change in conversion could be as little as
0 to 3%. If elasticities are on the high side of our
range, the slow-down of conversion could be as
m u c ha s2 . 5t o9 % .
Figure 1. Potential Reduction in Grassland to Cropland Conversion Due to Sodsaver when New
Land Rules are in Force
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, May 2011 208Conclusion
We found significant variation in the potential
effect of Sodsaverbetween high conversion and
comparison counties and also among the high
conversion counties themselves. In a small
group of counties (Hand, Hyde, and Sully), the
effect of Sodsaver would be relatively large,
reducing total expected revenue by 4.2 to 5.4%
and expected net return by 10 to 14%. Other
high conversion counties (Beadle, Edmunds,
Faulk, and Stutsman) would experience more
modest effects, withSodsaver-induced reductions
in expected revenue of between 2.1% and 3.4%
a n dr e d u c t i o n si nn e tr e t u r no f4 . 9t o7 . 7 % .
Comparison counties experienced the smallest
effects of 1.7 to 1.9% reductions in expected
revenue and a reduction of roughly 3.4% in
expected net return. Risk effects would be even
more varied. Hyde and Sully counties stand out
with estimated risk premiums approaching 2%
of expected revenue. In other high conversion
counties, however, risk premiums vary between
0.8 and 1.0% while comparison counties have
risk premiums of 0.9 to 1.1%.
SURE payments would be a significant
share (20–25%) of benefits subject to Sodsaver.
The ultimate effect of SURE on land use and
other production decisions may depend on
whether farmers view SURE as a more stable,
reliable source of disaster assistance compared
with ad hoc programs which have been the
norm in recent years. Greater certainty about
disaster assistance could make farmers more
willing to include it when ‘‘penciling out’’
grassland conversion decisions. On the other
hand, farmers may already consider disaster
assistance when making these decisions, given
the frequency of ad hoc disaster programs.
Crop insurance and SURE provide producers
with protection against intra-season losses due
to an unexpected drop in crop yield or price.
Producers can receive benefits when expected
crop prices are at historically high levels (as in
our analysis), providing some protection against
loss when market-based conversion incentives
are highest. Marketing loan benefits, on the
other hand, protect producers against low abso-
lute prices. For our base (2008) prices, the pos-
sibility of marketing loan benefits is remote. If
prices fall dramatically or if Congress elects to
raise loan rates, producers could, once again,
receive marketing loan benefits. Of course,
lower crop prices would also mean sharply
reduced conversion incentives. Again, we note
that marketing loan benefits are not subject to
Sodsaver.
Finally, would theSodsaver sanctionbelarge
enough to make a difference in land use con-
version? Previous studies imply that major land
use change is not very responsive to changes in
revenue or net return. If that is true, the re-
duction in conversion due to Sodsaver is likely
to be modest even in counties where the effect of
Sodsaver would be relatively large. Even when
considering relatively large conversion elastici-
ties, estimated reduction in grassland to crop-
land conversion is 9% or less.
Temporarily denying crop insurance and
SURE payments on converted grassland may
not be enough to stop native grassland conver-
sion. Many other factors may also be at work:
Long term changes in policy, technology, and
markets may be encouraging farmers to convert
grassland to cropland. Farm program changes
from the mid-1990s allow producers to expand
crop production beyond base acreage and shift
to non-traditional crops without risking loss of
commodity payments. The availability of genet-
ically modified corn and soybeans has triggered
a switch from wheat to corn and soybeans all
along the western edge of the traditional Corn
Belt. The switch may also be drawing strength
from explosive growth in corn demand for etha-
nol production and other purposes.
Given the limited effect of Sodsaver on farm
program benefits, it should not be surprising that
its land use effect is also modest. The Wetland
Conservation or ‘‘Swampbuster’’ provision is
a policy model with more significant sanctions.
Under Swampbuster, farmers who drain wet-
lands could lose nearly all farm program pay-
ments throughout the farm—not just on drained
acres. Although crop insurance is not currently
subject to Swampbuster sanction, producers
could lose direct payments, countercyclical pay-
ments, marketing loan benefits, Conservation
Reserve Program payments, and other program
benefits. A similar provision, designed to con-
serve native grassland, could provide a stronger
Claassen, Cooper, and Carriazo: Effect of Sodsaver on Incentives for Grassland Conversion 209disincentive to grassland conversion than we es-
timate for the current Sodsaver provision.
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